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Abstract 
Three studies tested whether individualism–collectivism moderates the extent to 
which values are endorsed as ideal self-guides and ought self-guides, and the consequences 
for regulatory focus and emotion. Across Studies 1 and 2, individualists endorsed values that 
are relatively central to the self as stronger ideals than oughts, whereas collectivists endorsed 
them as ideals and oughts to a similar degree. Study 2 found that individualists justified 
central values using reasons that were more promotion-focused than prevention-focused, 
whereas collectivists used similar amount of prevention-focused and promotion-focused 
reasons. In Study 3, individualists felt more dejected after violating a central (vs. peripheral) 
value and more agitated after violating a peripheral (vs. central) value. Collectivists felt a 
similar amount of dejection regardless of values centrality and more agitation after violating 
central (vs. peripheral) values. Overall, culture has important implications for how we 
regulate values that are central or peripheral to our self-concept. 
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Maintaining the balance between pursuing personal strivings and fulfilling others’ 
expectations is one of the many acts one has to juggle in life. The relative importance people 
place on personal strivings and others’ expectations is at least partly influenced by whether 
the broader culture emphasizes the independent or the interdependent aspect of the self 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Similar cultural differences pertain to the amount of importance 
people place on ideal self-guides and ought self-guides. According to Higgins (1998), ideal 
self-guides include individuals’ representation of attributes that they would ideally possess, 
and they function as personal aspirations. In contrast, ought self-guides include individuals’ 
representations of attributes that they should or ought to possess, and they function as norms 
or external standards.  
Cultural differences in self-guides are the starting point for this paper. Ideals serve as 
the predominant self-guide in individualist cultures, whereas the role of duties and 
obligations is higher and can be fused with that of ideals in collectivist cultures, such that 
oughts and ideals both play prominent roles as self-guide (e.g., Chan, 1997; Higgins, 1996). 
These cultural differences also have important implications for regulatory focus (e.g., Lee, 
Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) and emotion (e.g., Kim & Aubrey, in press), as comprehensively 
depicted by Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997). Yet, no research thus far has assessed the 
associations between self-guides, regulatory focus and emotion simultaneously in a cross-
cultural context.  
More important, no research has addressed this issue in the context of values. Values 
are widely conceived as trans-situational goals that serve as guiding principles in one’s life 
(Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; C. Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), 
thereby helping to guide behaviour in various ways (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Roccas, Sagiv, 
Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Values have long been an important construct in cross-cultural 
studies research, which has revealed many similarities in values. In over 70 nations, there are 
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(a) consistent patterns of correlations between values (Schwartz et al., 2012), and (b) 
similarities in meaning and content (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Nonetheless, there are 
unanswered questions about the extent to which the psychological use and meaning of values 
is culturally invariant (e.g., Morris, 2013; Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 1997; Schwartz, 2013). In 
the present research, we address this topic by investigating how basic values (e.g., equality, 
freedom) are endorsed as ideal and ought self-guides in two different cultures. Are values that 
are more central to the self more likely to be endorsed as ideal self-guides than as ought self-
guides? How does culture shape the role of values as self-guide? We also assess the 
regulatory focus of values endorsed as ideals and oughts, and the emotional consequences of 
violating values endorsed as ideals and oughts.  
Values as Self-Guides 
When we consider a value to be important, are we cherishing the value as an ideal, as 
an important duty and obligation, or equally as an ideal and ought? Extant theory has 
suggested that values serve as both personally desired modes of conduct and externally 
imposed behavioral standards, and many models of values encompass this would-should 
duality (see Rohan, 2000), including theories proposed by F. R. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
(1961), Allport et al.(1960), and Schwartz (1992). Values often contain an intrinsically 
motivating element; at the same time, people are socialized to support values in order to 
avoid social and moral sanctions (Schwartz, 1999). Thus, perspectives on values have been 
open to roles of values as both ideals and oughts. 
We propose that there are important cultural differences in the role of values as ideals 
and oughts. Potential cultural differences in the use of values as self-guides can be seen by 
considering Rokeach’s (1973) proposition that values vary in their centrality to the self. 
Values that are judged to be highly important are more central to the individual’s self-
concept, while values that are more moderate or low in importance are relatively peripheral to 
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the self-concept. In this sense, central values, compared to peripheral values, are more likely 
to reflect the core self. However, as indicated above, the ideal-ought conceptualization of the 
core self varies across cultures. Because culture plays a role in shaping the self, we propose 
that culture also shapes whether values connected to the self are held as a personal ideal, a 
social obligation, or both.  
To elaborate, studies on cross-cultural differences in self-construal have revealed that 
individualists tend to consider the self as the basic unit of analysis (Triandis, McCusker, & 
Hui, 1990), and they exert their independence by expressing their unique internal attributes 
(Johnson, 1985). Independent self-construal features the realization of internal potential and 
the promotion of own goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Hence, within individualist 
cultures, where an independent self-construal is dominant, the endorsement of central values 
should be more relevant to internal aspirations than to external prescriptions from others. The 
role of central values as ideals may therefore be particularly strong and dominant.  In 
contrast, because peripheral values are not as closely connected to the core self, these values 
may display qualities that are less typical of ideals and may instead be more relevant to what 
is deemed as secondary obligations and responsibilities. As a result, in comparison to central 
values, the role of ideal self-guides in peripheral values may decrease and the role of ought 
self-guides in peripheral values may increase, potentially leading to a greater emphasis on 
ought self-guides than ideal self-guides.  
Within a collectivist culture, there is an emphasis on both the individual and the group 
(Nakane, 1970), wherein the maintenance of a harmonious, interdependent relationship 
within the group is vital (Miller, 1988). It is important for collectivists to fit in the group, 
engage in actions approved by the norm, and promote others’ goals (Higgins, 1996; Kim & 
Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a result, the difference between ideals and 
oughts is more blurred in self-representations in collectivist cultures than in individualist 
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cultures (Chan, 1997; Miller, Das, & Chakravarthy, 2011). Hence, in collectivist cultures, the 
endorsement of central values should be relevant to both personally valuable ideals and 
socially prescribed standards. That is, central values should be held more strongly as both 
ideals and oughts, while peripheral values should also be held less strongly and endorsed 
equally as ideals and oughts.  
Effects on Regulatory Focus and Emotion 
These predictions provide clues about the potential role of values in regulatory focus 
and emotion. The extent to which values are held as ideals versus oughts should affect the 
extent to which people strive to fulfill the values using a promotion focus or prevention focus. 
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998), promotion-focused strategies 
seek matches to a goal. They induce a state of eagerness or approach, which fosters behavior 
designed to attain a goal. In contrast, prevention-focused strategies avoid mismatches to the 
goal. They induce a state of vigilance or avoidance, causing behavior that avoids moving 
away from a goal. In regulatory focus theory, perceived discrepancy between the actual self 
and ideal self-guides activates a promotion focus and increases sensitivity to positive 
outcomes, while perceived discrepancy between the actual self and ought self-guides triggers 
a prevention focus and increases sensitivity to negative outcomes (Higgins & Tykocinski, 
1992). Consequently, if central values are more likely to function as ideal self-guides within 
individualist cultures, thoughts about central values should reflect eagerness, approach, and 
positive outcomes, whereas if peripheral values are more likely to function as ought self-
guides, thoughts about peripheral values should emphasize vigilance and avoidance and more 
reflection on negative outcomes. This difference in regulatory focus should be diminished 
within collectivist cultures, where the distinction between ideals and oughts is blurred.  
The roles of ideals and oughts for central and peripheral values also have 
ramifications for understanding the emotional consequences of successful and failed attempts 
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to fulfill values. In general, actual-ideal discrepancies lead to dejection-oriented emotions 
(e.g., sadness). In contrast, actual-ought discrepancies lead to agitation-oriented emotions 
(e.g., anxiety; Higgins, 1989; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 
1997), especially when one becomes aware of observation from the public (Carver & Scheier, 
1986; Higgins, 1996). Thus, within an individualist culture, if central values function more 
strongly as ideal self-guides, violation of the values should elicit dejection-related emotions. 
Conversely, if peripheral values function more strongly as ought self-guides, violation of the 
values in a public setting should elicit agitation-related emotions. Within a collectivist 
culture, violation of central and peripheral values should engender both dejection-related and 
agitation-related emotional outcomes, due to the lack of difference in the role of ideal and 
ought concerns between the values. 
The Present Research 
The present research examined three implications of the hypothesis that there are 
cross-cultural differences in the roles of central and peripheral values as self-guides. We 
tested whether there are cultural differences in the role of value centrality in predicting (a) 
values’ roles as self-guides (Study 1), (b) the extent to which thoughts about values 
encapsulate eagerness, approach, and positive outcomes versus vigilance, avoidance and 
negative outcomes (Study 2), and (c) the extent to which the violation of values elicits 
dejection-related and agitation-related emotions (Study 3). 
To provide these tests, the studies focused on comparing Western participants from 
predominantly Britain and/or the USA with Eastern participants from India. Extant evidence 
indicates that Britain and the USA are relatively individualist nations, while India is relatively 
collectivist (e.g., Suh et al., 1998). In addition, we measured value centrality in a manner 
congruent with the precedent set by Rokeach (1973). Specifically, we asked participants to 
rank the importance of the values to them as guiding principles in their lives. There is no firm 
                                                                                     Values as Self-Guides 8 
line to segregate central values from peripheral values, but we regarded the highest ranked 
values as the most central to the self, and values rated in the middle or lower as relatively 
peripheral to the self. Consideration of the middle values as being peripheral provided a 
conservative test of centrality (especially in Studies 2 and 3) by ensuring that the values 
conceived as relatively peripheral were nonetheless at least average in importance, thereby 
still clearly qualifying as “values”. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested whether value centrality plays a role in self-guide endorsement (ideal 
vs. ought) among British and Indian participants. Participants rated the roles of values as self-
guides using items developed by Higgins (1987). Higgins asked participants to provide self-
related attributes (e.g., honesty) and rate the degree to which they ideally wish to possess 
(ideal self-guide), should possess (ought self-guide), and actually possess the attributes 
(actual self). Similarly, people can be asked to rate the extent to which they ideally would be 
guided by specific values (ideal self-guides), the extent to which they should be guided by the 
values (ought self-guides), and the degree to which they actually are guided by the values 
(actual self).  
These ratings enabled us to test whether, within the individualist culture, central 
values are endorsed more strongly as ideal self-guides than as ought self-guides. Furthermore, 
the ratings enabled us to test whether the role of ideals decreases as values become peripheral 
to the self while the role of oughts increases, potentially leading to a greater emphasis on 
oughts than ideals. Finally, we investigated whether this interaction between value centrality 
and self-guide is eliminated in the collectivist culture, such that central values are endorsed 
(equally) more strongly as ideals and oughts than are peripheral values. 
Method 
                                                                                     Values as Self-Guides 9 
Participants. 139 participants were recruited. In the United Kingdom, 39 Cardiff 
University undergraduate students (26 women, 13 men) received course credit for 
participating. Their age ranged from 18 to 26 (M= 20.92, SD=  2.08). In India, 100 Karnatak 
University undergraduate students (47 women, 53 men) received course credit for 
participating. Their ages ranged from 21 to 29 (M= 22.75, SD=  1.42). The smaller UK sample 
was due to availability of participants during the time of year when the research was 
conducted.  
Procedure and materials. For 20 values, participants completed measures of (a) 
value centrality and (b) the values’ roles as ideal, ought, and actual self-guides. The order of 
these two tasks was randomized.  
The measure of value centrality was based on Rokeach’s (1973) ranking approach. 
Participants ranked 20 values by placing a number from 1 to 20 next to each value. The 
values were core examples of each of the four higher-order orthogonal value domains in 
Schwartz’s Value Survey (1992): self-enhancement, self-transcendence, conservation, and 
openness to change. The self-enhancement domain serves self-interest and was represented in 
this research by the values of achievement, social power, success, and authority; the self-
transcendence domain promotes the welfare of others and was represented here by the values 
helpful, broadminded, social justice, and forgiving; the conservation domain serves to protect 
the status quo and was represented by the values self-discipline, obedient, devout, 
reciprocation of favors, respect for tradition, and national security; the openness domain 
serves quests for novelty and independence and was represented by the values exciting life, 
enjoying life, creativity, daring, freedom, and pleasure. Values ranked closer to 1st were 
considered more central for a subsequent task (see below).  
The measure of values as self-guides was presented on a computer in the UK and on 
paper in India. For each of the 20 values, participants rated the extent to which they (a) 
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ideally, (b) should, and (c) actually possess the value. For example, participants were asked 
“to what degree should you possess this value?” We provided additional instructions adapted 
from Higgins (1987) describing the actual self (i.e., your beliefs about the values you think 
you actually possess), the ideal self (i.e, your beliefs about the values you would like ideally 
to possess), and the ought self (i.e., your beliefs about the values you believe you should or 
ought to possess). Participants’ ratings utilized a scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much so). 
The order of presentation of the ideal and ought rating scales was randomized after each 
value, and the actual scale appeared last for each value. Two extra values were used at the 
start of the task as practice. 
Results 
Functioning as ideal versus ought self-guides. To assess the relative strength of 
self-guides (ought vs ideal2) as a function of value centrality in different cultures, we 
conducted a random-intercept multilevel analysis. We assigned a participant number to each 
participant and entered these numbers in the model as the higher level (level 2) random 
variable. The two types of self-guide rating (effect coded: ought=-1, ideal=1) were included 
as the lower level (level 1) predictor. We then included value centrality as a continuous fixed 
predictor. We reversed-coded the value rankings such that a bigger number represent higher 
centrality and then centered them around the mid-point of the ranking such that -9 represents 
the most peripheral value, 0 represents a value ranked in the middle, and 10 represents the 
most central value. We also included culture of each participant as a fixed predictor (effect 
coded: collectivist=-1, individualist=1). Because gender and value domain (i.e., self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, openness, vs. conservation) did not contribute to higher 
order interactions, we omitted these variables from subsequent analyses. 
To prepare the data for analysis, we disaggregated them (see Heck, Scott, & Lynn, 
2013; Snijders & Bosker, 2004). For each participant, there were 20 rows of data reflecting 
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the ideal ratings for values ranked from -9 to 10 and another 20 rows of data reflecting the 
ought ratings for values ranked from -9 to 10. 
The results showed that values were held significantly more strongly as ideal self-
guides than ought self-guides, β=0.03, Se=0.01, t(5268.13)=2.50, p=.013. Also, more central 
values served as stronger self-guides than more peripheral values, β=0.05, Se=0.002, 
t(5269.13)=26.82, p< .001. In addition, individualist participants and collectivist participants 
endorsed their values to a similar degree, β=0.04, Se=0.03, t(136.01)=1.28, p=.20. The two-
way interactions between self-guide and value centrality, self-guide and culture, and value 
centrality and culture were all significant, β=0.004, Se=0.002, t(5268.13)=2.01, p=.04, β= 
0.04, Se=0.01, t(5268.13)=3.41, p=.001, and β=0.02, Se=0.002, t(5269.13)=8.71, p< .001, 
respectively.  
More important, the three-way interaction among self-guide, value centrality, and 
culture was significant, β=0.004, Se=0.002, t(5268.13)=2.01, p=.04 (see Figure 1). We 
conducted simple slopes analyses using the computational tools developed by Preacher, 
Curran, and Bauer (2006). We estimated value endorsement as ideals and oughts at two 
values of value centrality: the middle ranking (0) and the top-most rank (10). The results 
revealed that individualist participants held their most important values as ideal self-guides 
more strongly than ought self-guides, γ=0.144, Se=.035, Z=4.165, p < .001. The same was 
true for values ranked in the middle, γ=0.063, Se=.018, Z=3.482, p < .001. Hence, in an 
individualist culture, the most important values and values ranked in the middle were both 
held more strongly as ideals than oughts, although this difference was more pronounced in 
magnitude for the most important values than those ranked in the middle. Of interest, the 
region of significance analyses revealed that ideals were held more strongly than oughts 
when values centrality was higher than -2.758. This corresponds to values ranged from 
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position 1 (the most important) to approximately 14 in the original ranking scale. Beyond the 
14th rank (the more peripheral values), ideals and oughts were endorsed to a similar degree.  
Participants from the collectivist culture endorsed ideal self-guides and ought self-
guides to a similar degree for values ranked as the most important, γ=-0.017, Se=.022, Z=-0. 
768, p=.442, and for values ranked in the middle of the scale, γ=-0.010, Se=.011, Z=-0.864, 
p=.388. Further, the region of significance analyses revealed that ideals and oughts were held 
with similar strength across the whole spectrum of values centrality. In other words, 
participants from a collectivist culture endorsed central values strongly as ideals and oughts 
to a similar degree and they endorsed peripheral values less strongly as ideals and oughts, but 
also to a similar degree. 
Discussion 
Study 1 found that value centrality played a role in the endorsement of ideal self-
guides and ought self-guides in an individualist culture (the United Kingdom). In this culture, 
values deemed more central to the self are endorsed more strongly as ideals than oughts. 
These results support the hypothesis that the central values carry more idealistic features than 
ought features for people from an individualist cultural background. In addition, this 
difference was significantly attenuated as the values became more peripheral to the self. As 
the values became more peripheral, the difference in self-guide strength for ideal and ought 
values decreased. Unexpectedly, the difference in ideal vs ought self-guide strength was 
completely eliminated only in the lower third of the value rankings, and not at the middle 
peripheral value. This suggests a weaker attenuation than expected, but a reliable attenuation 
nonetheless. Furthermore, as expected, the central and peripheral values were both endorsed 
at least as strongly as oughts as ideals in the collectivist culture (India). These results support 
the hypothesis that people from a collectivist cultural background regard their most central 
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values as ideals and ought self-guides, consistent with theory and evidence that these cultures 
show greater assimilation of the self to collective, external needs (Miller, 1988).  
Study 2 
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings in Study 1, while broadening the 
recruitment of participants beyond student samples by conducting the study over the Internet. 
Further, we examined the implications of self-guide differences for regulatory focus. We 
expected that values endorsed as ideals should entail a regulatory focus that emphasizes the 
promotion of positive outcomes, whereas values endorsed as oughts should entail a 
regulatory focus that emphasizes the prevention of negative outcomes. The findings in Study 
1 revealed that only participants from an individualist culture endorsed more central values as 
ideals (vs. ought). Hence, we expected that only participants from the individualist culture, 
but not the collectivist culture, would provide reasons in line with a promotion (vs. 
prevention) focus for central values. Further, the findings in Study 1 revealed that participants 
from an individualist culture endorsed values ranked in the middle as ideals (vs oughts), but 
the strength of endorsement was smaller in magnitude compared to the value ranked as the 
most important. Hence, participants from the individualist culture should also provide more 
reasons in line with a promotion (vs. prevention) focus for values ranked in the middle, but to 
a lesser degree than the value ranked as the most important. 
Method 
Participants. The online study included 378 participants. In our individualist sample, 
220 participants self-identified as American, British, Irish, or any other White background. 
They comprised 153 women and 67 men, whose age ranged from 18-73 (M= 32.28, SD=  
13.17). They were either volunteers recruited via Psychological Research on the Net (Krantz, 
1995-2015; n= 53), a Southampton University participant panel (n= 47), or Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; n= 121). In our collectivist sample, 158 participants self-identified 
                                                                                     Values as Self-Guides 14 
as Indian. They comprised 56 women and 102 men, from 19-62 years of age (M= 29.60, SD=  
8.07), recruited via Mturk. We screened for workers on Mturk who live in the United States 
or India and had a job acceptance rate record of 95% or above. Interclass correlations (ICCs) 
showed that the proportion of variance in the outcome measure that was due to the source of 
data (e.g., MTurk, university) was close to zero and redundant. Hence, the source of data was 
excluded from the analyses below. 
Procedure. The values ranking and values-as-self-guides tasks were identical to 
Study 1. Participants then read instructions adapted from a procedure developed by Higgins, 
Bond, Klein, and Strauman (1986). We asked participants to provide reasons why several 
values should be considered important or not important. Participants were informed that the 
values would be randomly picked from the list they had seen at the start of the study. In fact, 
the assigned values had been given the positions of 1 (central), 10 (middle peripheral), or 20 
(most peripheral) in the ranking task.  
Participants’ reasons were then coded for promotion, prevention, or neutral focus. Our 
coding scheme was based on previous research (e.g., Friedman & Forster, 2001; Higgins, 
1997; Semin, Higgins, de Montes, & Estourget, 2005). A coder labeled reasons as promotion 
focused when they expressed the positive symbolic nature of the value and went beyond the 
immediate concrete value outcomes (e.g., “ambition provides competition hence goals and 
achievement”). These reasons focused on eagerness, approach, and positive outcomes. 
Reasons were coded as prevention focused when they focused on vigilance against or 
avoidance of negative outcomes (e.g., “it is important because it enables you to avoid doing 
wrong”). Reasons were coded as non-regulatory when they were neither promotion nor 
prevention focused, did not directly address the task, or seemed out of context (e.g., “don’t 
live in London”). The non-regulatory reasons were not included in the analyses. 
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We used two trained coders. They independently coded all participants’ reasons and 
were both blind to the centrality of the values. The reliability of coding was satisfactory 
(Krippendorff’s α=.90; Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007). The coders resolved disagreements 
between them by discussion.  
Results  
Functioning as ideal versus ought self-guides. To assess the relative strength of 
self-guides (ought vs ideal2) as a function of value centrality in different cultures, we 
conducted a random-intercept multilevel analysis as in Study 1. We entered the participant 
identification number in the model as the higher level random variable and the types of self-
guide rating (ought=-1, ideal=1) as the lower level predictor. We also included value 
centrality (reverse-coded and centered: middle ranked value=0, most central value=10) and 
culture (collectivist=-1, individualist=1) as fixed predictors. Because gender and value 
domain did not contribute to further higher order interactions, we omitted these variables 
from subsequent analyses. 
The results showed that values were held significantly more strongly as ideal self-
guides than ought self-guides, β=0.04, Se=0.006, t(14560.08)=6.37, p < .001. Also, more 
central values served as stronger self-guides than more peripheral values, β=0.05, Se=0.0009, 
t(14564.723)=54.04, p < .001. In addition, individualist participants and collectivist 
participants endorsed their values to a similar degree, β=0.02, Se=0.02, t(376.39)=0.99, p=.33. 
The two-way interaction between self-guide and value centrality was marginally significant, 
β=0.002, Se=0.01, t(14560.06)=1.87, p=.06. The two-way interactions between self-guide and 
culture, and value centrality and culture were significant, β=0.02, Se=0.006, 
t(14560.08)=2.72, p=.006, and β=0.02, Se=0.001, t(14564.72)=19.49, p < .001, respectively.  
More important, the three-way interaction among self-guide, value centrality, and 
culture was significant, β=0.004, Se=0.001, t(14560.06)=4.03, p < .001 (see Figure 2). In the 
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individualist culture, ideal self-guides were endorsed more strongly than ought self-guides for 
values ranked as the most important, β=0.110, Se=.014, Z=7.783, p < .001. The same was 
true for values ranked in the middle, β=0.052, Se=.007, Z=7.029, p < .001, but the difference 
between ideal and ought self-guides was more pronounced for the most important values than 
those ranked in the middle. Further, the region of significance analyses revealed that ideals 
were held more strongly than oughts when values centrality was higher than -5.387. This 
corresponds to values ranged from position 1 (most important) to approximately 16 in the 
original ranking scale. Beyond the 16th rank (more peripheral values), ideals and oughts were 
endorsed to a similar degree.  
Among participants from a collectivist culture, ideal self-guides and ought self-guides 
were held similarly strongly for values ranked as the most important, β=-0.0005, Se=.017, 
Z=-0.028, p=.977. Unexpectedly, for values ranked in the middle, collectivist participants 
endorsed ideal self-guides more strongly than ought self-guides, β=0.021, Se=.009, Z=2.39, 
p=.017. Further, the region of significance analyses revealed that values were endorsed more 
strongly as ideals than oughts when values centrality is lower than 1.649. This corresponds to 
values ranged approximately from position 9 to 20 in the original ranking. For values ranked 
from position 1 to 8 (the more central values), ideals and oughts were endorsed to a similar 
degree. 
Hence, for central values, participants from an individualist culture endorsed them as 
ideals more strongly than oughts and participants from a collectivist culture endorsed them 
equally strongly as ideals and oughts. These findings were consistent across Studies 1 and 2. 
As for more peripheral values, participants from an individualist culture showed little 
differentiation between ideals and oughts, as in Study 1. However, unlike Study 1, 
participants from a collectivist culture endorsed their peripheral values as ideals more 
strongly than as oughts.  
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Reasons for central and peripheral values. For values ranked as the most important, 
8 participants gave no reason why their value was important, and 54 participants gave non-
regulatory responses (e.g., “because it is important”). For values ranked in the middle, 26 
participants gave no reason why their value was important, and 42 participants gave non-
regulatory responses. The following analyses focused on the valid responses only. 
We examined the use of reasons within each culture. In the individualist cultures, a 
2x2 chi-square analyses revealed that the type of reasons participants gave to support their 
values depended marginally on value centrality, χ2(1)= 3.00, p= .08. Specifically, participants 
used more promotion-focused reasons (n=131) than prevention-focused reasons (n=70) to 
support their central values, χ2(1)= 18.51, p< .001. For peripheral values, participants used 
only marginally more promotion-focused reasons (n=107) than prevention-focused reasons 
(n=82), χ2(1)= 3.31, p= .07.  
In the collectivist sample, the 2x2 chi-square analyses revealed that the type of 
reasons participants gave to support their values depended on value centrality, χ2(1)= 6.01, 
p= .014. Specifically, participants used promotion (n=62) and prevention (n=53) reasons to 
the same extent for their central values, χ2(1)= 0.70, p= .40. In contrast, they used more 
promotion-focused reasons (n=84) than prevention-focused reasons (n=37) to support the 
values they ranked in the middle, χ2(1)= 18.26, p< .001. 
Discussion 
Results once again indicated that central values were endorsed primarily as ideals in 
an individualist culture, whereas they were endorsed equally strongly as ideals and oughts in 
a collectivist culture. In addition, when participants in an individualist culture provided 
reasons to support their central values, which they endorsed as ideal self-guides, the 
participants exhibited more promotion focus than prevention-focus. When participants in a 
collectivist culture provided reasons to support their central values, which they endorsed as 
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both ideal and ought self-guides, the participants exhibited as much promotion focus as 
prevention focus.  
For values ranked in the middle, participants from an individualist culture endorsed 
them more strongly as ideals than oughts, but to a lesser degree in magnitude compared to 
central values. In turn, these participants provided reasons that did not exhibit significantly 
more promotion focus than prevention focus when supporting their peripheral values. Both 
results were consistent with Study 1.  
The interesting exceptions to Study 1 occurred when we examined the peripheral 
values among participants in the collectivist culture. Study 1 found no significant difference 
between ideal and ought ratings for peripheral value, whereas Study 2 found that the 
peripheral values were endorsed more strongly as ideals than oughts. Further, this difference 
was also exhibited on the measure of regulatory focus in values, with participants from the 
collectivist culture providing reasons that exhibited more promotion focus than prevention 
focus when supporting their peripheral values. This evidence suggests that participants in a 
collectivistic culture regarded peripheral values as equally ideal and ought-related in Study 1, 
but more as ideal self-guides in Study 2. 
As a post-hoc explanation for this finding, we suggest that central values in a 
collectivist culture may help to meet necessary obligations and requirements from the social 
environment by merging them with the ideal self, whereas peripheral values may be more 
like personal ideals that are pursued only after important obligations are met. In other words, 
the striving for personal ideals per se may be relegated to those values that are less central. 
Although we believe this mechanism is plausible, it does not explain why the enhanced role 
of ideals in peripheral values was revealed in Study 2 and not Study 1. It may be the case that 
the greater diversity of participants in Study 2 (from the online sample) than in Study 1 (the 
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student sample) represented a greater diversity of interests, enabling the role of the ideal self-
guides for peripheral values to emerge. 
Notwithstanding this exception to the consistency across both studies, the importance 
of culture in the differential use of central vs peripheral values as self-guides was again 
demonstrated, using both our measure of self-guide strength and a measure of regulatory 
focus. Thus, Study 3 considered implications of these findings for emotional processes. 
Study 3 
Self-discrepancy theory indicates that the differences in the use of values as self-
guides and regulatory focus have implications for the emotions that people experience after 
value violation (Higgins, 1989; Higgins et al., 1997). To examine these emotional 
implications, we followed the precedent of abundant past research on cognitive dissonance, 
which has often induced a counter-attitudinal behavior by asking people to write an essay 
opposing their own position on a topic (e.g., Cooper, 1999; Elliot & Devine, 1994). We 
manipulated whether participants wrote an essay against either a central or peripheral value.  
To facilitate experimental control similar to that in prior research on counter-
attitudinal behaviors, this study returned to utilizing student samples in a laboratory context. 
Consistent with our results with these samples (Study 1) and our broader theorizing, the 
emotional effects of arguing against values in these samples should depend on culture and 
value centrality. As outlined earlier, actual-ideal discrepancies should predict dejection-type 
emotions and actual-ought discrepancies should elicit agitation-type emotions. Our evidence 
indicated that, in an individualistic culture, central values function predominantly as ideal 
self-guides and less so as ought self-guides and this difference is attenuated for more 
peripheral values (Studies 1 and 2). Hence, we expected that individuals from an 
individualistic culture who oppose their central values should experience more dejection than 
agitation. Those who oppose their peripheral values may also experience more agitation than 
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dejection. In contrast, Study 1’s evidence indicated that students in the collectivist culture 
hold their central values equally more strongly as ideal and ought self-guides and peripheral 
values equally less strongly as ideal and ought self-guides. Hence, these students who oppose 
their central values should not experience different levels of dejection and agitation. Those 
who oppose their peripheral values may also experience similar levels of dejection and 
agitation.  
In addition, we explored whether the setting in which the violation of values took 
place moderated the emotional experiences of values violation. Visibility is one way that 
makes ought self-guides become more self-relevant (Carver & Scheier, 1986; Higgins, 1996). 
We assessed whether participants experienced more agitation than dejection after violating 
their peripheral values when they become aware that their responses are highly visible to 
others, compared to when they violated their peripheral values in private. We also examined 
whether individuals from an individualistic culture and a collectivistic culture would have 
different emotional experiences due to the visibility setting.    
Method 
Participants. We recruited 216 participants. In the United Kingdom, 92 Cardiff 
University undergraduate students (69 women, 23 men) received £3 for participating. Their 
age ranged from 18-45 (M= 21.78, SD=  4.40). In India, 124 Karnatak University 
undergraduate students (30 women, 94 men) volunteered to take part. Their age ranged from 
20 to 29 (M= 22.06, SD=  1.95).  
Experimental Manipulation 
Value opposition. Participants first completed the ranking task as described in Study 
1. In a so-called second study, participants were informed that the researcher would randomly 
select a value from the list that they had seen in the previous study. In fact, the researcher 
verbally provided the most central value (rank 1) or a peripheral value (rank 10) from the 
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ranking task. To induce a discrepancy between the chosen value and the relevant self-guide, 
participants were asked to write a short essay arguing against the values. They were asked to 
identify reasons why this value is unimportant by describing the negative consequences 
associated with the value. 
Public versus private setting. Half of the participants in each of the value conditions 
were randomly assigned to either the public or private settings. In the public condition, 
participants were told that the researcher would copy their reasons and distribute them in 
order to influence participants in subsequent studies. Participants in the private condition 
were told that the reasons were very rarely examined and, to maintain their privacy, 
participants should seal the reasons in an envelope provided by the researcher. 
Emotions. The “third study” was introduced as a pilot study for a new emotion 
measure. Participants were asked to indicate how dejected and agitated they felt at that time. 
The measure of dejection (0=not at all, 4=extremely) comprised four-item: discouraged, 
disappointed, low, and sad (α=.75). The measure of agitation also comprised four-item: 
agitated, on edge, uneasy, and tense (α=.76). 
Results 
To test whether the violation of central and peripheral values elicit different types of 
emotion under different setting and cultures, we conducted a 2 (setting: public, private) x 2 
(culture: individualist, collectivist) x 2 (values: central, peripheral) x 2 (emotion: dejection, 
agitation) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on ratings of emotion elicited by the 
value violations, with repeated measures on the first factor. Results revealed a significant 
main effect of setting, F(1, 208)= 13.87, p<  .001, ηp2 = .06[.020, .122]1, such that the value 
violations elicited more emotions in a public setting (M=  1.54, SE=  0.08) than in a private 
setting (M=  1.12, SE=  0.08). The main effect of culture was significant, F(1, 208)= 121.12, 
p<  .001, ηp2 = .37[.284, .441], such that collectivist participants experienced more emotions 
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after violating values (M=  1.95, SE=  0.07) than did individualist participants (M=  0.71, SE=  
0.09). There was a significant main effect of values, F(1, 208)= 4.18, p=  .04, ηp2 = .02[.001, 
.061], such that violations of central values elicited more emotions (M=  1.44, SE=  0.08) than 
violations of peripheral values (M=  1.21, SE=  0.08). Also, there was a significant main effect 
of types of emotion, F(1, 208)= 11.04, p=  .001, ηp2 = .05[.013, .106]. After violating their 
values, participants experienced more agitation (M=  1.41, SE=  0.06) than dejection (M=  
1.25, SE=  0.06).  
These main effects were not qualified by any two-way or three-way interactions, Fs(1, 
208)< 3.13, ps>  .08, ηp2s< .02, except for the three-way interaction between culture, values, 
and emotion, F(1, 208)= 13.59, p<  .001, ηp2 = .06[.019, .120] (see Figure 3). Among 
participants from an individualist culture, the crucial interaction between values and emotion 
was significant, F(1, 90)= 14.42, p<  .001, ηp2 = .14[.045, .247]. Within this culture, the 
violation of central values elicited marginally more dejection (M=  0.84, SE=  0.11) than 
agitation (M=  0.69, SE=  0.12), F(1, 45)= 3.38, p=  .07, ηp2 = .07[.000, .207]. The violation of 
peripheral values elicited more agitation (M=  0.83, SE=  0.12) than dejection (M=  0.52, SE=  
0.11), F(1, 45)= 11.80, p=  .001, ηp2 = .21[.056, .362]. Also, participants from an individualist 
culture experienced significantly more dejection after arguing against a central value than 
after arguing against a peripheral value, F(1, 90)= 4.67, p= .03, ηp2 = .05[.002, .137]. They 
experienced a similar level of agitation after arguing against a central value and after arguing 
a peripheral value, F(1, 90)= .69, p= .41, ηp2 = .008[.000, .062]. 
Among participants from a collectivist culture, the two-way interaction between 
values and emotion was marginally significant, F(1, 122)= 3.85, p=  .052, ηp2 = .03[.000, 
.095]. Within this culture, the violation of central values elicited more agitation (M=  2.33, 
SE=  0.13) than dejection (M=  1.92, SE=  0.13), F(1, 62)= 15.49, p<  .001, ηp2 = .20[.069, 
.334]. The violation of peripheral values elicited similar levels of dejection (M=  1.72, SE=  
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0.13) and agitation (M=  1.83, SE=  0.13), F(1, 60)= 1.03, p=  .32, ηp2 = .02[.000, .103]. Also, 
participants from a collectivist culture experienced a similar level of dejection after arguing 
against a central value than after arguing a peripheral value, F(1, 122)= 1.12, p= .29, ηp2 = 
.009[.000, .056]. They experienced more agitation after arguing against a central value than 
after arguing a peripheral value, F(1, 122)= 7.58, p= .007, ηp2 = .06[.009, .136]. 
Discussion  
In Study 3, we found that the emotional consequences of value violation depended on 
culture.  In both an individualist and a collectivist culture, the violations of central values led 
to different emotional consequences than the violation of peripheral values. In the 
individualist culture, violation of central values evoked relatively more dejection-related 
emotion (compared to agitation-related emotion) than the violation of peripheral values, 
which evoked relatively more agitation-type emotions (compared to dejection-type 
emotions). These results support the hypothesis that, within an individualist culture, central 
values function more as ideal self-guides that ought self-guides, whereas peripheral values, 
which are endorsed relatively less strongly as ideals, function more as ought self-guides than 
ideal self-guides. In the collectivist culture, this pattern reversed: violations of central values 
evoked relatively more agitation-related emotion (compared to dejection-related emotion) 
than violations of peripheral values (which elicited similar levels of both emotions).  
These results fit our expectations for the individualistic culture, but our prior findings 
with a collectivist student sample led us to expect no differential impact of central vs 
peripheral values in this group. Nonetheless, this result fits our conjecture about the 
mechanism separating the central versus peripheral values following the data obtained in 
Study 2. If the central values are prioritized partly because of their roles as oughts, while the 
peripheral values are relegated to serving those ideals that are secondary in importance, then 
violation of the central values may elicit relatively more agitation-related emotion (compared 
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to dejection-related emotion) than violations of peripheral values. On balance, these effects 
appear to reside between the implications of the results of Studies 1 and 2. More important, 
the effects are robustly different from those obtained consistently in the individualist cultures. 
Thus, regardless of the precise pattern of role of values as self-guides in a collectivist setting, 
it is clear that it differs in a predictable direction from the consistent role of values as self-
guides in an individualistic setting.  
Another finding of interest was that the emotional impact of value violation was 
higher in the public setting than in the private setting in both cultures, and regardless of 
whether the values were central or peripheral. Past research showed that the violation of 
ought self-guides elicits agitation in a public setting but not in a private setting; whereas the 
violation of ideal self-guides elicits dejection in both public and private settings (Carver & 
Scheier, 1986; Higgins, 1996). The lack of any interactions between setting and value type 
and culture in our design indicates that the violations of values were generally more 
pronounced in a public setting, suggesting that this setting did not activate ought self-guides 
alone – the public setting may have augmented the personal importance of both types of self-
guide. Perhaps an interesting question for future research is whether this dual augmentation is 
more likely for value violations than for other types of activity in which self-guides are 
relevant (e.g., violating specific personal goals, advocating particular self-relevant actions).   
General Discussion 
Cultures have strong influences on the manifestation of self-construal, with 
implications on motivation and emotion (Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, & Hori, 2009; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). As such, if there is a cultural basis 
for the way values act as self-guides, it should have matching implications of values as self-
guides on regulatory focus and emotional outcomes of values violation. We assessed this 
proposition across three studies. 
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In both Studies 1 and 2, ideals and oughts mapped onto different levels of value 
centrality depending on the culture. In an individualist culture, central values were rated as 
stronger ideal self-guides than ought self-guides, whereas, in a collectivist culture, central 
values were endorsed as ideals and oughts to a similar degree. In an individualist culture, the 
difference between the two types of self-guides was weaker in magnitude and nonsignificant 
among the most peripheral values, whereas, in a collectivist culture, peripheral values were 
endorsed as ideals and oughts to a similar degree in Study 1 (using a university student 
sample) and peripheral values were endorsed more strongly as ideals than oughts in Study 2 
(using an online community sample).  
These results are consistent with past research on how the self is construed in different 
cultures. Independent self-construal emphasizes the actualization of personal aspirations 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The pursuit of personal ideals becomes the top priority in the 
values system, whereas the difference between the pursuit of personal ideals and the 
fulfillment of social obligations gradually diminishes as values become more peripheral to the 
self. In contrast, interdependent self-construal has a strong emphasis on the needs and goals 
of the group (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). Hence, the pursuit of personal ideals and 
the fulfillment of social duties both play a central role in cultures that stress collective 
interdependence. In these cultures, central values are more likely than peripheral values to 
reflect pursuits that are highly relevant to the self and to demands from the group.  
These cultural differences have matching effects on the regulatory focus of values. In 
Study 2, participants in an individualist culture justified their central values using reasons that 
emphasized the promotion of positive outcomes, and this difference in favor of promotion 
was attenuated when they justified their peripheral values. The use of promotion-focused 
reasons for central values reflects an urge to approach a goal, which is a typical aim of ideal 
self-guides. Hence, in an individualist culture, central values embed promotion regulatory 
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focus consistent with the nature of ideal self-guides, and peripheral values embed a relatively 
weaker promotion focus. These differences in the roles of central and peripheral values were 
virtually reversed among participants from a collectivist culture. These participants used 
prevention-focused and promotion-focused reasons to a similar extent for their central values, 
whereas they were more likely to exhibit a promotion focus than a prevention focus for their 
peripheral values, consistent with the data regarding the role of ideal self-guides in peripheral 
values within this sample.  
Study 3 demonstrated that the dominant roles of ideal and ought self-guides for 
central versus peripheral values have important emotional consequences. In an individualist 
culture, violations of central values cause more dejection-related emotion (compared to 
agitation-related emotion) than the violation of peripheral values (which elicited more 
agitation than dejection). Falling short of one’s ideals triggers dejection-related emotions, and 
falling short of one’s oughts triggers agitation-related emotions. These effects fit our findings 
that, in an individualist culture, central values are endorsed as ideals and pursued with a 
promotion focus. Consequently, when people fail to live up to their ideal self-guide, they feel 
sad and disappointed. These effects on emotion also fit our findings that, in an individualist 
culture, central values function predominantly as ideal self-guides and less as ought self-
guides (Studies 1 and 2); thus, those who oppose their peripheral values should experience 
more agitation-related emotion.  
Again, these effects on emotional outcomes were different among participants from a 
collectivist culture. In this culture, the violations of central values triggered more agitation 
(compared to dejection) than violations of peripheral values (which induced similar levels of 
both emotions). These results extend Study 2’s evidence that, in a collectivist culture, central 
values are endorsed as both ideals and oughts and are pursued with both promotion and 
prevention focus, whereas peripheral values are endorsed relatively more strongly as ideals 
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than oughts and are pursued with more promotion focus. It seems that, compared to 
peripheral values, central values display features that are closer to ought self-guides in a 
collectivist setting and hence the violation of central values made people feel relatively 
agitated and tense. Although peripheral values may display features that are closer to ideal 
self-guides, they do not fully translate into distinct feelings of sadness and disappointment.  
Overall, then the manifestation of values as self-guides depends on culture in all three 
studies. In an individualist culture, central values exhibit features that are prototypical of 
ideal self-guides rather than ought self-guides. Individualists’ central values evince a 
prioritization of ideals over oughts, leaving their peripheral values to endeavor ought self-
guides. In contrast, in a collectivist culture, central values display mixed features that are 
prototypical of ideals and oughts. This indicates that collectivists’ central values manifest 
themselves as ideal and ought self-guides more equally – a pattern that corroborates findings 
showing collectivists’ strong sense of obligation to respond to demands from the group (Kim 
& Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).   
Together, these studies make several key contributions. First, they provide novel 
evidence of the complex links between self-guides, regulatory focus and emotion in a cross-
cultural context. Second, the studies reveal these links by integrating research on the 
individualist-collectivist dimension in culture and research on self-guides with an important 
concept that has been subjected to abundant cross-cultural research: values. Third, by 
integrating these perspectives, we are able to better predict how people may respond to values 
in different cultures. For example, in an individualist culture, people who hold environmental 
preservation as a central value may feel sad and dejected when they notice that they are using 
a car more often than necessary. In contrast, people who hold environmental preservation as a 
peripheral value may feel anxious and agitated. In contrast, in a collectivist culture, failure to 
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fulfill values may simply elicit more anxiety and agitation when the values are central to the 
self than when they are peripheral to the self.  
It is also noteworthy that values centrality predicted the endorsement of values as self-
guides and the content of values did not contribute to this effect in Studies 1 and 23. We 
included all of the values identified by Schwartz (1992) in our research and the content of 
some values may seem more likely to fulfill roles as “ideals” than as “oughts” (Leikas, 
Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, & Lindeman, 2009). For example, people may more easily imagine the 
value of “freedom” as involving the pursuit of a desired personal ideal, rather than as the 
pursuit of a required obligation. Yet, the content of values did not moderate the associations 
between values centrality and type of self-guide. What matters is the importance people place 
on values. To our knowledge, this is the first evidence separating the role of value centrality 
from value content for understanding value-relevant self-regulation and emotion. 
Limitations and Broader Implications 
 The present research delineated important associations between value endorsement 
and self-guides in two different cultures. We obtained findings consistent with abundant prior 
evidence of differences in self-construal between individualistic and collectivistic cultures ( 
e.g., Chan, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These findings also raise a number of 
interesting issues for future study, and we highlight two issues here. 
First, we chose to compare participants from Britain, United States, and India because 
of prior evidence indicating that these nations are far apart on the individualist-collectivist 
dimension (e.g., Suh et al., 1998). Yet, it would be interesting to examine the functioning of 
values as self-guides in nations other than those examined in this research because recent 
research showed that individualism and collectivism manifest themselves differently in 
different countries (Vignoles et al., 2014). Further, past research identified slight variations in 
the relative dominance of prevention and promotion regulatory focus in different collectivist 
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nations. Some studies found that Indians considered their personal ideals and social duties as 
equally important (Chan, 1997) and that Indians internalized their social duties more closely 
to their core self than Americans (Miller et al., 2011), whereas Chinese (Lee et al., 2000) and 
Asian Canadian (Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005) people are more prevention-focused 
than promotion-focused. These variations may also apply to the regulatory focus of value 
endorsement, such that central values may be endorsed more strongly as oughts than ideals in 
some collectivist nations outside of India.  
 Second, we assessed the extent to which violation of different values triggered 
dejection and agitation in different cultures; in other words, our focus was on the relative 
differences between dejection and agitation as a function of central vs peripheral values in 
each culture. It would be interesting to compare these emotional responses to conditions in 
which no values were violated. Although such an experimental condition is tangential to our 
primary interest in the relative prominence of different self-guide orientations (as a function 
of value centrality and culture), an experimental condition without values violation could 
provide an additional baseline to test whether the violation of central and peripheral values 
leads to a net increase or a decrease in both dejection and agitation.   
Coda 
In sum, the present research reveals novel evidence that cultural differences in the role 
of self-guides extend to how people construe basic values. This indicates that mental 
representations of values as self-guides vary between cultures.  Moreover, these cultural 
differences matter, because they have predictable ramifications for individuals’ regulatory 
focus toward the values and the emotional consequences of value violation.  
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Footnote 
1In reporting effect sizes, we used partial eta-squared and we presented the confidence 
intervals (CI) in brackets. The CIs were calculated using scripts developed by Wuensch 
(2012) and were computed at 90% because it represents the .05 criterion of statistical 
significance (Steiger, 2004). 
2Supplementary analyses controlling for actual self ratings produced very similar results. We 
therefore presented a more parsimonious model without this covariate. 
3Past research indicates that individualistic cultures tend to prioritize openness values 
(Schultz & Zelezny, 2003) and self-transcendence values (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), whereas 
collectivistic cultures tend to value conservation values (Schwartz, 2007). Indians, in 
particular, tend to prioritize values that are congruent with self-enhancement values (e.g., 
being successful, getting ahead; Schwartz, 2008). We found consistent cultural differences in 
Studies 1 and 2. Individualist participants ranked openness values (Study 1: β=0.54, Se=0.22, 
t(136.34)=2.51, p=.013; Study 2: β=0.44, Se=0.14, t(376.46)=3.15, p=.002) and self-
transcendence values (Study 1: β=0.87, Se=0.25, t(136)=3.47, p=.001; Study 2: β=0.49, 
Se=0.15, t(375.65)=3.31, p=.001) as more central, whereas collectivist participants ranked 
conservation values (Study 1: β= -0.57, Se=0.21, t(136)=-2.74, p=.007; Study 2: β=-0.30, 
Se=0.14, t(376.32)=-2.21, p=.028) and self-enhancement values (Study 1: β=-0.73, Se=0.26, 
t(136)=-2.75, p=.007; Study 2: β=-0.68, Se=0.14, t(375.61)=-4.94, p<.001) as more central. 
Yet, content of the values does not account for the endorsement of values as ideal or ought 
self-guides. 
3 For values ranked as the least important, 11 participants gave no reason why their value was 
important, 64 participants gave non-regulatory responses (e.g., “because it is important”), and 
216 participants gave reasons explaining why the value was not important (e.g., “I don't put 
much value on this issue because the issue of national security brings fear in people's lives 
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and the world”). The following analyses focused on the remaining 87 valid responses. In the 
individualist sample, participants used promotion (n=16) and prevention reasons (n=11) to a 
similar extent for the values they ranked as the least important, χ2(1)= .93, p= .34. Similarly, 
in the collectivist sample, participants used promotion (n=24) and prevention (n=36) reasons 
to a similar extent for the values they ranked as the least important, χ2(1)= 2.40, p= .12. 
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Table 1.  
Distribution of Types of Reason Given to Central Values and Peripheral Values within 
Individualist and Collectivist cultures in Study 2 
 Total Sample Individualist Collectivist 
Types of reason given to central values (N) (n1) (n2) 
Prevention 127 77 50 
Promotion 183 123 60 
Summary 310 200 110 
Types of reason given to peripheral values    
Prevention 127 82 45 
Promotion 182 107 75 
Summary 309 189 120 
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Figure 1.  Self-guides ratings as a function of values centrality and culture in Study 1.  
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Figure 2. Self-guides ratings as a function of values centrality and culture in Study 2.  
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Figure 3.  Dejection and Agitation as a function value centrality and culture in Study 3 
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